ADR 026: Console audience, authorization and audit log
- Status: Accepted
- Owner: Eng lead, security owner
- Date: 2026-11-14
Context
The console must not show one tenant another tenant's data, and it is the platform's highest-privilege surface. Every console role (owner, admin, developer, auditor) is granted for an organization or one project; there is no platform-operator role.
Decision
- Audience: product teams. Every console endpoint is scoped in SQL to the caller's organizations and projects and enforces the role on the server; the UI hides what the role cannot do, but never relies on that.
- No platform-wide views (infrastructure health, other tenants, all users) until a platform operator role is approved (PD-1). Operators use the CLI, health endpoints and runbooks meanwhile.
- Audit log is append-only in the database: triggers reject
UPDATE,DELETEandTRUNCATEonaudit_eventsfor every role (migration0002). Refused changes are recorded (console.denied), as are sign-ins, sign-outs, session revocations and exports. - Exports are built and audited on the server (
usage.exported) and contain no secrets or personal data. - Content stays private: no endpoint returns message bodies, attachment contents or recordings. Participant identities (
project:user:device, product-chosen IDs) are shown because ending a participant needs them. - Own account: each user can list and end their own sessions and read their own sign-in history. Account creation, password resets and disabling stay in the operator CLI.
Consequences
Customer self-service sign-up, MFA and step-up re-authentication need decisions first (PD-1, PD-2).