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Security overview

Security architecture, implemented protections, checks performed and known remaining risks.

Last reviewed 2026-11-13 (see the audit and findings register). Engineering controls, not legal advice; Fidescript and any regulated data need a separate security and privacy review. No penetration test has been performed. This page does not claim the platform is fully secure: it records what is implemented, how it was checked, and what remains.

Credentials

CredentialHolderIn browser/mobile?Storage
Service key lynk_live_…/lynk_test_…Product backendNeverLynkoria stores keyId + HMAC-SHA256(pepper, secret), prefix/suffix
Messaging JWT (ES256, 10 min)ClientYesSigned with MESSAGING_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY; previous public keys accepted during rotation
LiveKit room JWT (5 min)ClientYesSigned with the project environment's LiveKit key
LiveKit API key/secretControl plane onlyNeverLIVEKIT_KEYS_JSON (secret manager)
Webhook signing secretProduct backendNeverDerived: HMAC(WEBHOOK_SECRET_MASTER, env + version); shown once
Console sessionConsole userHttpOnly cookie__Host- cookie, SameSite=Strict; SHA-256 of a 32-byte token; 30 min idle, 12 h max
Console passwordConsole userNever storedscrypt (N=2^17); 14+ characters; lockout after 5 failures; accounts only from the CLI
Scanner consumer tokenAPI (server)NeverSCANNER_TOKEN / SCANNER_TOKENS_JSON; constant-time compare; sent only over TLS with a pinned private CA (ADR 023)

Pepper, webhook master, messaging key, LiveKit secrets and database/Redis credentials live in the secret manager / App Platform encrypted env vars — never in Git, images, logs or cloud-init in the repo. Config validation reports variable names only, never values.

Controls by layer

LayerImplementation
Product authmiddleware/service-key.ts: constant-time digest compare, no cache (revocation is immediate), mode must match the deployment (lynk_test_ never reaches production), scopes, disabled environments rejected
Console authmodules/admin/console-auth.ts + middleware/admin-identity.ts: password sign-in (no registration), server-side sessions, per-IP and per-email limits, lockout; optional Cloudflare Access identity must match; console_roles → owner/admin manage, developer/auditor read; cross-origin mutations rejected
AuthorizationAll queries scoped by environment_id (+ tenant_id); other projects' ids return 404; sender identity from the token only
Tenancy in schemaComposite FKs (conversation_id, environment_id, tenant_id) on members, messages, attachments
APIzod validation on every input; 256 KiB body limit; message byte cap; rate limits per service key/user/admin and socket flood limits; strict CORS; secure headers incl. default-src 'none' CSP; client IP from one configured ingress header
WebSocketsOrigin allowlist (global + per environment); token on handshake; per-event authorization; rooms from claims only; event flood cutoff; expiry revalidation; suspension disconnect
LiveKitauto_create: false; per-environment maxParticipants; 5-min tokens; role-derived grants (canPublishData: false, no metadata self-update); removeParticipant with revokeTokenTs
WebhooksInbound: raw-body signature + event-id dedupe. Outbound: operator-approved HTTPS origins, timestamped HMAC, at-least-once, redirects not followed
FilesPrivate bucket; presigned PUT (signed type/length) to a quarantine/ key; HEAD verification; magic-byte type check, archive-bomb limits and ClamAV scan; only the scanned bytes are published; fail closed; presigned GET (5 min, attachment disposition) after membership checks
Loggingpino redaction of tokens, secrets, authorization headers and message bodies; metrics without key/user/room labels
Static sites_headers: HSTS, X-Frame-Options: DENY, nosniff, Permissions-Policy, CSP (console: script-src 'self'; docs: inline scripts required by the static export)
Supply chainLockfile, pinned action SHAs and images, gitleaks, pnpm audit, SBOM, Trivy scans of the API and scanner images, built-asset secret grep, OIDC publishing

Negative tests (CI)

Implemented in apps/api/test/*.test.ts against real PostgreSQL, Redis, LiveKit and S3-compatible storage:

  • VibeLynk-style key A cannot read, join or end project B's call
  • Body/query parameters cannot override the key's project or environment
  • lynk_live_ key against a staging deployment (mode/environment mismatch)
  • Workspace A cannot read workspace B messages; other projects with identical user/tenant ids are isolated
  • Sending after membership removal
  • Revoked service key fails on the next request
  • Viewer tokens cannot publish (grants derived server-side)
  • Expired / foreign-project / service-key-as-JWT messaging tokens
  • Socket handshake from a non-allowlisted Origin, without or with an invalid token
  • Reusing another user's attachment, or an attachment twice; non-member download
  • Non-member sending over the socket; presence leakage across tenants
  • Suspended user obtaining a new room token; suspended user's sockets disconnected
  • Joining a room the control plane did not create (real LiveKit)
  • LiveKit webhook with an invalid signature; replayed event id
  • Admin endpoint without a valid Access JWT; service key on admin endpoints; developer creating keys; auditor mutating
  • Composite FK rejects a message pointing at another tenant's or environment's conversation

Known limits

  • Self-hosted LiveKit cannot revoke an arbitrary unexpired token; removeParticipant requests token invalidation but this is not treated as a verified self-hosted revocation guarantee. TTL is 5 minutes; hard bans should recreate the room.

  • Socket revalidation is per instance, but suspensions disconnect sockets on every instance through the Redis Streams adapter (ADR 021).

  • Rate limits fail closed with 503 while Redis is unavailable; persisted data remains in PostgreSQL.

  • Attachments uploaded before scanning was enabled stay not_scanned and are not served while a scanner is configured; no rescan backfill exists.

  • Scanner throughput, and ClamAV detection quality beyond EICAR and archive bombs, are unmeasured.

  • Per-environment LiveKit keys support rotation and attribution, not SFU tenant isolation. A separate Fidescript media deployment currently requires a separate API deployment because each API has one LiveKit endpoint.

  • v1 has no row-level security policy or cross-node socket adapter; application checks and composite foreign keys enforce the tested boundaries (database). Production IAM/network and restore controls require infrastructure verification.

  • The console CSP allows connect-src https: because the API origin is a build-time variable; tighten it per deployment.

  • Presence is visible tenant-wide and service keys are environment-wide trusted credentials; product backends must enforce contact/block rules.

Security checks performed (2026-11-13)

CheckResult
Manual code reviewAuth, sockets, attachments, console sign-in, webhooks, scanner, config; findings in register
pnpm audit --prodNo known vulnerabilities
pnpm audit (incl. dev)1 moderate: esbuild ≤0.24.2 via drizzle-kit (dev-only, no dev server used); accepted
Negative/integration testsAPI suite against real PostgreSQL, Redis, LiveKit, S3-compatible storage and a scanner
Static site CSPDocs export served with its CSP: navigation and search work, no violations in the console
Secret scanning, image scansRun in CI (gitleaks, Trivy); not re-run locally in this audit

Use the pre-deploy checklist before every production deployment.

Rotation

See operations.

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